February, 193o

University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly, November to June, by the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Copyright 1930, by the University of Pennsylvania.
$4.50 PER ANNUM; FOREIGN, $5.00; SINGLE COPIES,

65 CENTS.

BOARD OF EDITORS
CARROLL P. WETZEL, Editor-in-chief
W. FREDERIC COLOLOUGH, Jn, Managing Editor
MEYER L. GIRSH, Note Editor
JOSEPH FIRST, Case Editor
ANDREW . SCHRODER, 31.Boolk Review Editor
GEORGE W. KEITEL, Business Manager
Associate Editors
MARK E. LEFEVER
SAMUEL A. ARMSTRONG
ELIAS MAGIL
GEORGE M. BRODHEAD, JR.
R. PAUL MITCHELL
LOUIS GORRIN
WALTER N. MOLDAWER
MILTON GOULD
MAXWELL S. ROSENFELD
GERTRUDE HOF"FMAN
JOHN A. SKELTON, JR.
RICHARD W. HOGUE, JR.
FRALEY N. WEIDNER, iR.
BENJAMIN R. JONES, Jn.
HYMAN ZUCKERMAN
D. BENJAMIN KRESCH
ARTHUR W. BEAN
JOHN P. BERRY
OSCAR M. DAVIS
DUDLEY T. EASBY, JR.
SAMUEL HANDLOFF
KNOX HENDERSON
DANIEL LOWENTHAL
BERNARD G.

JACK J, McDOWELL
,ILO G. MILLER, JR.
HARRY POLIKOFF
PAUL H. RHOADS
JACOB S. RICHMAN
SAMUEL J. ROBERTS
WILLIAM B. RUDENKO
SEGAL

Associate Business Managers
DAWSON H. MUTH
CLARENCE MESIROV
SAMUEL H. STEWART
WALTER J. BROBYN
MORRIS M. WEINSTEIN
B. M. SNOVER. Treasurer

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
FOWLER VINCENT HARPER,A. M., 1925, University of Iowa; S. J. D., 1927,

University of Michigan; Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School;
contributor to several legal periodicals.
JosEPH A. McCLAIN, JR., A.B., 1925; LL. B., 1924, Mercer University;
J.S. D., 1929, Yale University; Dean of the Mercer University School of Law;
member of the Georgia Bar Association and the American Bar Association.
FoRREsr REVERE BLAcx, A.B., 1916, University of Wisconsin; M.A., 1919,
Columbia University; LL. B., ig2o, Ohio State University; Ph.D., 1925, Robert
Brookings Graduate School of Government; Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky; member of the bars of Ohio and Kentucky; author of various legal
articles.

(531)

February, 193o

ANNOUNCEMENT
The REVIEW is pleased to announce the election of Richard W.
Hogue, Jr., of the Third Year Class, to the Editorial Board.
The REVIEW also takes pleasure in announcing the election of
the following members of the Second Year Class. To the Editorial
Board: Arthur W. Bean, John P. Berry, Oscar M. Davis, Dudley T.
Easby, Jr., Samuel Handloff, Knox Henderson, Daniel Lowenthal,
Jack J. McDowell, Milo G. Miller, Jr., Harry Polikoff, Paul H.
Rhoads, Jacob S. Richman, Samuel T. Roberts, William B. Rudenko,
and Bernard G. Segal. To the Business Board: Walter J. Brobyn,
Samuel H. Stewart, and Morris M. Weinstein.

NOTES.
TAXATION

OF INTANGIBLES-RECENT

1
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT -The

DEVELOPMENTS IN

THE

maxim mobilia sequuntur

personam at one time operated to bring all personal property, for
purposes of taxation, within the jurisdiction of the State of the

owner's domicil. In the case of tangible property the doctrine has
now been restricted so as to avoid a result that would involve double
taxation. The case of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky 2
and the decisions following, both elaborating and limiting its doctrine,3
have succeeded in establishing the test of fairness as controlling the
taxation of tangible personal property; the maxim is simply disregarded when its utilization would effect injustice, e. g., where the
tangibles have acquired a taxable situs elsewhere. Although the
courts have recognized a modification of the fiction to the extent of
allowing intangibles also to acquire a situs for tax purposes apart

from their owner, yet these same principles have never been applied
to avoid an equally unjust result in the case of intangible property,
which has uniformly been held taxable, by application of the fiction,
also at the domicil of the owner.4 There has been some indication in
This note was written before the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court was handed down in the case of Farmers Loan & Trust Co., Executor v.
Minnesota (January 6, 193o; U. S. Daily, January 8, 193o). The thesis of this
note is supported by the decision and reasoning in the above case.
2 igg U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (io5).
'See particularly Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct 6o3
(1923) ; New York Central & Hudson River R. R. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584, 26
Sup. Ct. 714 (i9o5) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 Sup.
Ct. 13 (911).
' Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40
(917) ; cf. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. I, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1927) ; Bullen
v. Wisconsin, 24o U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (i9x6); Kidd v. Alabama, i8S
U. S. 730, 23 Sup. Ct. 401 (192) ; Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. I, 34 Sup. Ct.
201 (1913); see GOODRICH, CONFLICT oF LAws (1927) go; Beale, Jurisdiction to
(532)
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State authorities that such a distinction is not justifiable,- and in the
recent case of Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v,. Virginia6
certain language of the Supreme Court of the United States clearly
indicates that in the case of intangibles that court likewise feels that
the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam should be disregarded in
certain cases where its application would "involve possibilities of
an extremely serious character by permitting double taxation, both
unjust and oppressive." 7 If this language be considered as an
annunciation of general principles which should control the taxation
of intangibles, it is hard to see how it can fail to discredit previous
Tax (919) 32 HAmv. L. REv. 587, 593. This result is usually accomplished by
a personal tax on the owner measured by his wealth in which assessment is
included his intangible personalty.
'Commonwealth v. West India Oil Refining Co., 138 Ky. 828, 129 S. W. 301
(igio); State v. Harrington, 68 Mont 1217 Pac. 681 (1923). Some of the
decisions may be distinguished as merely construing the tax statute of the state
rather than denying the power to assess such a tax. People v. Smith. 88 N. Y.
576 (i882) ; Hoyt v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224 (iS6i) ; People v.
Gardner, 5I Barb. 352 (N. Y. 1868).
5o Sup. Ct. 59 (1929). A trust was established by a resident of Virginia
in favor of his two sons, also residents of Virginia. The property, which consisted of stocks and bonds, was transferred to a trust company in Maryland to
be held for accumulation and to be divided between the beneficiaries upon their
attaining the age of twenty-five. The donor reserved to himself power of revocation but died without exercising it. Under an appropriate statute the entire
corpus of the estate was assessed to the trustee for taxation by Virginia and this
assessment was sustained by the Virginia Supreme Court. 151 Va. 883 (1928).
On appeal this holding was reversed, Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting. No question was raised as to the naming of the trustce mstead of the cestuis que trust as
the party taxed; the only problem presented was whether the corpus, so created
and held, had a taxable sitits in Virginia within the sanction of Section i of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
'In the course of the majority opinion and in discussing the application of
the maxim mobilia sequntnur personan, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice
McReynolds, said: "Ordinarily this court recognizes that the fiction mobilia
sequuntur personam may be applied in order to determine the situs of intangible
personal property for taxation. But the general rule must yield to established
fact of legal ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere, and ought not to
be applied if so to do would result in inescapable and patent injustice, whether
through double taxation or otherwise. Here where the possessor of the legal
title holds the securities in Maryland, thus giving them a permanent situs for
lawful taxation there, and no person in Virginia has present right to their enjoyment or power to remove them, the fiction must be disregarded. It plainly conflicts with the facts; the securities did not and could not follow any person
domiciled in Virginia. Their actual situs is in Maryland and ca.Mot be changed
by the cestuis que trust. . . . The reasons which led this court (in the Union
Refrigerator and Frick cases) to deiy application of the noxiin iwbilia sequnutur persona n to tangibles apply to the intangibles in appellant's possession.
They have acquired a situs separate from that of the beneficial owners. The

adoption of a contrary rule would 'involve possibilities of an extremely serious
character' by permitting double taxatimn, both un-just and oppressive. And the
fiction of mobilia sequuntur personam 'was intended for convenience, and not to
b- controlling where justice does not demand it.! . . . It would be unfortutnate, perhaps amazing, if a legal fiction originally invented to prevent personalty
from escaping just taxation should compel us to accept the irrationalview that
the saiw securities were within the two states at the same instant aid because of
this to uphold a double and oppressive assessment." Italics the writer's.
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s
and equally general statements of this court on the subject. Whether
it intimates a feeling by the court in respect to intangible property
similar to that previously expressed for tangible is naturally speculative; the court has shown no such indication heretofore, yet the
justice of the now established rule as regards tangible property has a

strong appeal.
The actual holding in the case is sound law in theory and
precedent; for purposes of taxation the situs of intangible trust property is at the domicil of the trustee, the legal owner; ' the mere fact
that the beneficiaries of a trust are within a state does not confer
power to tax the entire corpus of the estate; it is essential for the
validity of such a tax that either the trustees or the corpus be within
the state. 10 Such was the decision of this same court in Brooke v.
and, as is pointed out by Mr. Justice Stone in his conNorfolk
curring opinion, is sufficient to rule the case at hand. The majority
opinion however goes much further; they say, in effect, the fiction of
mnobilia sequuntur personam will not be applied to sustain this tax,
not only because there is no owner in Virginia for the corpus of the
estate to follow, the beneficiaries having only an equitable interest,
but also because to apply the fiction would "involve possibilities of
an extremely serious character," would "compel us to accept the
8
In Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S.325, 40 Sup.
Ct 558 (192o) the court upheld what was in effect a tax on the intangible prop-

erty of a corporation whose property and business were entirely within another

state. Said the court: "The company was confessedly domiciled in North Dakota; for it was incorporated under the laws of that state. . . . The fact that
its property and business were entirely in another State did not make it any the
less subject to taxation in the State of its domicil. The limitation imposed by
the Fourteenth Amendment is merely that a State may not tax a resident for
property which has acquired a permanent situs beyond its boundaries . ..
The limitation upon the power of taxation does not apply even to tangible per-

sonal property without the State of the corporation's domicil, if, like a sea-going
vessel, the property has no permanent situs elsewhere. Nor has it any application
to intangible property, even though the property is also taxable in another State
by virtue of having acquired a 'business situs' there. . . . The conclusion
drawn by them (counsel for the corporation) is that the situs of the intangible
must be with the tangible; otherwise, they say, we must hold that it is in two
places at once and that it may be subjected to double taxation. To this it is
sufficient to say that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit double taxation."
9

Higgins v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 211, 103 S. W. 3o6 (1911); State v.

Willard, 77 Minm. 90, 79 N. W. 829 (1899) ; Guthrie v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati
& St. Louis Ry., 158 Pa. 433, 27 Atl. lO52 (1893) ; Goodrich, op. cit. supra note
4, at 96.

°Augusta v. Kimball, 91 Me. 6o5, 4o AtI. 666 (1898) ; Anthony v. Caswell,

15 R. I. 159, i Atl. 290 (1885). Contra: Selden v. Brooke, 104 Va. 832, 52 S. E.
632 (19o6); Humbird v. State Tax Commission, 141 Md. 405, 119 Atl. 157

(1922). However there is no doubt that a State may nevertheless assess a resident beneficiary to the extent of his equitable interest Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass.

287, 43 N. E. 103 (1896) ; St. Albans v. Avery, 95-Vt 249, 114 Atl. 31 (1921);
cf. Maguire v. Tax Commissioner, 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct 417 (920).
11 277 U. S. 27, 48 Sup. Ct. 422 (1928).
The opinion is by Mr. Justice

Holmes.
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irrationalview that the same securities were within two states at the
same instant and because of this to uphold a double and oppressive
assessment." While it is quite possible that this language may prove
to be gratuitous dicta of little value, yet it is equally possible that it
may be an indication that the court now recognizes that a blanket
application of the fiction in the case of intangibles sometimes results
in hardship through double taxation which might well be avoided.
In the absence of reciprocity statutes by the various states, double
taxation is more than probable and intangibles may conceivably be
taxed in three or even more states. A brief review of the law may
serve to show the extent the courts have gone in this respect and also
how deftly they have avoided the prospect of double taxation in the
case of tangible property.
In Roman times practically all personalty was of such a nature
that it could be easily transported and carried from place to place at
the whim of the owner; its chief characteristic was the ease with
which it could be moved. As a result a fiction arose to the effect that
movables were in law inseparable from their owner and were located
within the same jurisdiction, regardless of their actual situs. The
utility of this rule, especially for purposes of descent and distribution
by will, was soon apparent to other nations and shortly the maxim,
inobilia sequuntur personam, was the established law of every civilized
nation; inheritances of personal property were recognizedly governed
by the rules of its owner's domicil. 12 It is easy to understand why
this fiction, so firmly established in the law of every country, should
have been looked to by our courts as furnishing a prima facie rule
for the situs of personal property for the purpose of taxation.
Under the letter of the maxim there was no distinction taken
between tangible and intangible personalty, but soon the very nature
of tangibles, their visibility, the fact that they are "easily found and
difficult to conceal",' led the courts to a recognition of their ability
to acquire a situs separate from that of their owner and consequently
taxation was permitted by the state within whose jurisdiction the
property was actually located.' 4 It was a short step from this theory
to the doctrine which was announced in the case of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky," that is, if tangible personal
property has acquired a situs in a jurisdiction other than that of the
owner, the power of the state of the owner's domicil to tax such property no longer exists, as in the case of real property, and such tax is
SToRY, CONFLICT oF LAws (8th ed. 1883) 537 ft.
13Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ky., supra note 2 at 206, 26 Sup. Ct.
at 38.
I&Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S.517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475 (i886) ; Pullman's Palace Car
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. I8, i Sup. Ct 876 (i8gi) ; Tappan v. Merchants'
National Bank, i Wall. 490 (1873); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Twombly, 29
Fed. 658 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1887); Irwin v. New Orleans, St. Louis & Chi.
R. R., 94 Ill. 1O5 (1879); Crawford v. Koch, 169 Mich. 372, 135 N. W. 339
(1912).

"5Supra note 2.
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in violation of the fourteenth amendment.1
The result of this and
other decisions of a similar nature was seemingly to explode the fiction of mobilic sequuntur personam as applied to tangible property.
Yet the mere fact that the property is not within the owner's state is
not sufficient to defeat its power; there must be the additional factor
of a situs elsewhere to bring an attempt to tax it within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment. Thus it is held that property
which, although not situated within the state of the owner's domicil,
is also not located within any other state for a sufficient time to acquire a permanent situs there may be taxed at the owner's domicil
under the fiction,"' and a fortiori property which is partially within
the owner's domicil and not permanently elsewhere."8
Thus the
ruling factor which determines the applicability of the fiction is the
acquisition of a situs other than that of the domicil of the owner; in
other words where to apply the fiction would result in double taxation,
the fiction is disregarded.' It is immaterial whether this is the basis
or merely the result of these decisions; the important thing is that
fairness both to the taxing power and the owner is accomplished.
This is in marked contrast to the result which has been reached
in regard to intangible property, the court having refused to apply
the same rules to both. It is true that in many respects the case of
intangibles presents a different problem, and a fundamental difference between the two types of personalty has led the courts to different
conclusions as to what circumstances constitute jurisdiction over them.
Many of the aspects which produced the doctrine of the Union Refrigeratorand Frick cases are lacking in the case of intangible property. As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in the former case: 20
6

This conclusion was reached under the theory that taxes should be levied
for an equivalent of protection rendered and that if property acquires a situs
elsewhere, it is then beyond the sovereignty of the owner's State and does not
and cannot receive protection from its laws; thus the right to tax it is lost.
This doctrine was extended to the case of inheritance taxes in Frick v. Pennsylvania sxfpra note 3; it was pointed out that there is no difference in principle
between property taxes and transfer taxes: "to impose either tax the State must
have jurisdiction over the thing that is taxed, and to impose either without such
jurisdiction is mere extortion and in contravention of due process of law. Here
the tax was imposed (by Pennsylvania) on the transfer of tangible personalty
having an actual situs in other states-New York and Massachusetts. This
property, by reason of its character and situs, was wholly under the jurisdiction
of those States and in no way under the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania . ..
The jurisdiction possessed by the States of the situs was not partial but plenary,
and included power to regulate the transfer both inter vivos and on the death of
the owner, and power to tax both the property and the transfer." See also
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 25 Sup.
Ct. 669 (Igo5); Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S.
385, 23 Sup. Ct. 463 (903).

17Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, sutra note 3; Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v.
Commissioners of Taxes, 64 N. Y. 541 (1876); Commonwealth v. American
Dredging Co., 122 Pa. 386, 15 Atl. 443 (1888).

" New York Central & Hudson River R. R. v. Miller, supra note 3.
" See Powell, Extra-TerritorialInherirance Taxation II (192o) 20 Co. L.
REV. 283, 300 if; Beale, op. cit. supra note 4, at 592.
11Sutpra note 2 at 205, 26 Sup. Ct. at 38.

NOTES
"There is an obvious distinction between the tangible and
intangible property, in the fact that the latter is held secretly;
that there is no method by which its existence or ownership can
be ascertained in the state of its situs, except perhaps in the case
of mortgages or shares of stock. So if the owner be discovered,
there is no way by which he can be reached by process in a state
other than that of his domicil, or the collection of the tax otherwise enforced. In this class of cases the tendency of the modem
authorities is to apply the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam,
and to hold that the property may be taxed at the domicil of the
owner as the real situs of the debt. . . . The arguments in
favor of the taxation of intangible property at the domicil of the
owner have no application to tangible property."
Yet despite the distinction taken in this case the Supreme Court has
often recognized that intangibles as well as tangibles can in fact acquire a taxable situs other than that of the domicil of the owner; 21
this has been held repeatedly in the case of bonds and commercial
paper, and the further doctrine of a "business situs" for credits is
now well established.2 2 Nevertheless such fact was never felt to
interfere with the power of the domicil of the owner to assess a personal tax which would include such property by means of the familiar
fiction; it was said that if this sometimes resulted in double taxation,
yet a contrary rule would allow this type of property often to escape
taxation altogether. The doctrine of the Union Refrigerator case
was held not applicable to intangibles in Fidelity & Colunibia Trust
Co. v. Louisville,23 the court saying:
"It is argued that this court has held the power of taxation
not to extend to chattels permanently outside the jurisdiction
although the owner was within it; and that the power ought
equally to be denied as to debts depending for their validity and
enforcement upon a jurisdiction other than that levying the tax.
But this court has not attempted to press the principle so far,
'New Orleans v. Stempel, I75 U. S. 3o9, 2o Sup. Ct. Io (899) ; Blackstone v. Miller, I88 U. S. i89, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903) ; cf. Corry v. Baltimore,

196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct 297 (,905).

"If the credits of a non-resident owner are continually and permanently
within a State, by processes of collection and reinvestment or otherwise, they are
sufficiently localized to have acquired a situs there, and consequently taxable.
See Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (I9OO) ; State

Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National D'Escompe, i9I U. S.388, 24 Sup. Ct.
zo9 (i9o3); Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt 152 (1849) ; Reat v. People, 2oi Ill. 469, 66
N. E. 242 (i9o3); note L. R. A. i915C 923. There is some indication that
bonds and commercial paper should be regarded as if the equivalent of tangible
property. Blackstone v. Miller, supra note 21; Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S.
434; 34 Sup. Ct. 6o7 (194). Yet a temporary deposit in another State of bonds
is seemingly not sufficient. Buck v. Beach, 2o6 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. 7i2

0907).

3245

U. S. 54, 58,38 Sup. Ct. 40, 41 (917).
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and there is opposed to it the long established practice of considering the debts due a man in determining
his wealth at his
this sort of tax."
domicil for the purposes of

Also in the recent cases of Bullen v. Wisconsin 24 and Blodgett v.
Silberman " the court has recognized the doctrine of mobilia
sequuntur personam in the case of intangibles, even though it is admitted that the property is also subject to legal taxation in another
jurisdiction and has in fact been taxed there. The prospect of double
taxation which was avoided in the case of tangibles by simply discarding the maxim when its utilization would effect injustice evidently heretofore has not worried the court in respect to intangibles.
This is the very reason which gives the language heretofore referred
to in the case at hand its peculiar interest. Should the language of
the decision be limited strictly to the situation under which it arose,
the case presents little interest. However inasmuch as up to the
present time, the outstanding feature of intangible property and its
relation to taxation has been the infallibility of mobilia sequuntur
personam, irrespective of double taxation, any intimation that in certain cases where its application would "involve possibilities of an
extremely serious character" the maxim must fade before the facts
should not be lightly regarded. - It may later be treated as of no importance outside of the particular case from which it sprang, but on
the other hand it may indicate-that the court entertains doubt as to
the propriety of a state's inclusion of intangibles with a taxable situs
elsewhere in an assessment on their owner. Such a result would
indeed be a very desirable one.2 6
K.H.

DOMESTICATION OF FOREIGN CORPOIiATIONS AND JURISDICTION
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS BASED ON DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP-

For purposes of jurisdiction of the Federal courts under the diversi.ty
clause I a corporation is conclusively presumed to be composed of
-iSupra note 4.
Supra note 4.
An application of the rules now considered to govern tangibles would seem
to overcome the reasons originally given for a distinction between the two types
of personalty, i. e., the fact that intangibles by their nature might escape taxation
entirely if not taxed at their owner's domicil. The "protection" theory of taxation reiterated by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion seems no longer
available as a guide; thus the only remaining reason for the rule is established
custom, a factor which applied with equal force to tangible property.
'U.

S. CONSTIruToN, Art. III, Sec. 2 (1) "The judicial power shall

extend to all cases, in law and equity . . . between citizens of different
states. . . .'" In execution of the grant of power found in this article, Con-

gress has passed numerous statutes relating to the jurisdiction of the national
courts.

NO TES
citizens of the state of incorporation. 2 When a corporation leaves
its charter state and does business in another state, it carries with it
the same presumption of citizenship, even though it is licensed in
the state where it is doing business.8 When the individuals who
organize the corporation in the first state petition for and receive a
charter in another state, a separate legal entity results. Even though
its management, membership and organization are identical, it exists
side by side with the corporate entity created in the first state and to
it the presumption of citizenship of the second state is applied.4 However, when the corporation created in the first state goes into the
second and is there "adopted" or made as such a corporation of the
second state, upon the filing of its original charter or the doing of
other specified acts, is a separate corporate entity with a distinct citizenship created?
In its first judicial determination of the matter," the Supreme
Court seemed to overlook the importance of an examination of the
nature of the alleged incorporation in the second state, although it
was pressed by counsel. Justice Taney, to whom we are indebted for
some of the confusion in some corporate problems,6 assumed that
when Ohio passed a statute to "recognize, confirm and adopt" the
charter of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company as enacted
by the legislature of Indiana and to authorize the extension of the
line of railroad into Ohio,7 a separate legal entity had been formed
in Ohio, requiring the application of the presumption of Ohio citizenship to its members even though they were identical with the
members of the Indiana corporation. There was apparently no doubt
in his mind that the words of the Ohio statute were just as effective
in creating a separate corporation for jurisdictional purposes, as if
the statute had set out at length a charter of incorporation granted
on petition of natural persons.
'Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (U. S. 1844 ). The principle
was reaffirmed in Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 2o How. 227, 232
(U. S. 1853). Before these cases, the right of a corporation to avail itself of
the Federal courts because of diversity depended on the citizenship of all its
members being in fact diverse from that of the other party to the suit. This was
a matter of averment and traverse in the pleadings. Bank of the United States
v. Devaux, 5 Cranch 6I (U. S. i8og). The fiction that all the members were
citizens of the state of incorporation obviated the necessity of any other averment in the pleading than the state of incorporation.
'Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5 (1881); Chapman v. Alabama G. S.
R. R. Co., 59 Fed. 370 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1894).
'Railroad Co. v. Whitton, I3 Wall. 27o (U. S. 1871). That other considerations may be involved in determining the jurisdictional question in a case involving an organization chartered in two states is pointed out in Goodwin v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 124 Fed. 358 (C. C. D. Mass. 19o3). A discussion
of that problem is not within the scope of this note.
IOhio and Mississippi R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, I Black 286 (U. S. 1862).
Arguments of counsel will be found in the report of the case in 17 L. Ed. 130.

'See

HENDERSON, THE POSITION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918) 172.

OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN

AMERIcAN

'See the Ohio Act of June 24, 1851, 49 Local Laws of Ohio 456, amending
the original act of Ohio of March I5, 1840.
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Eight years later, Justice Swayne, in Railroad Company v.
Harris,8 interpreted the Wheeler case as holding that one state could
by statute make a corporation of another state, as there organized
and conducted, a corporation of its own, "quo ad hoc any property
within its territorial jurisdiction". Whether this created a separate
corporation with a citizenship of its own was not stated." He declared the effect of such a statute as was enacted by Ohio in the
Wheeler case to be merely a licensing of a foreign corporation and
not an incorporation in Ohio and that this did not make the members of the corporation citizens of Ohio for jurisdictional purposes.
This interpretation was expressly a restriction and qualification of
the opinion in the Wheeler case.
Since the Harriscase there have been a line of decisions by the
Federal courts fixing the status, under the diversity clause, of a corporation chartered in one state and operating in another state under
what is termed for convenience a domestication statute, i. e., a statute
purporting to make a foreign corporation a domestic corporation upon
the doing of specified acts by the corporation and in some cases forFor'a while it seemed to
biding operation in the state otherwise.'
be the feeling of the lower Federal courts 11 that the effect of a
domestication statute was to create a separate local corporation with
its own citizenship. The opinions in those cases which reached the

Supreme Court, while apparently recognizing the principle, pointed
out that particular state statutes purporting to do so did not in fact
intend to incorporate foreign corporations as local corporations but
merely intended to license the foreign corporations to do business in
the state." In one case, 13 however, the statute was declared to have
1I2 Wall. 65 (U. S. 1870).

Since the Wheeler case was cited as authority for the principle and the
Wheeler case held that a separate corporation with a distinct citizenship had
been created, it would seem this was the interpretation meant. See Uphoff v.
Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. R. R. Co., 5 Fed. 545 (C. C. D. Ky. 188o). Yet the
subsequent restriction on the meaning of the Wheeler case would point the other
way.
10The domestication statute may be general or special. The general statutes
are usually restricted to foreign railroad corporations or public utility companies.
See the statute of Kentucky cited in Davis' Admr. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co.,
116 Ky. 144, 70 S. W. 857 (193o).

n Uphoff v. Chicago, St.L. & N. 0. R. R. Co., smpra note 9; Stout v. Sioux
City & P. R. R. Co., 8 Fed. 794 (C. C. D. Neb. i88i); Western & A. R. R. Co.
v. Roberson, 61 Fed. 592 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894) (requiring principal office to be
located in domesticating state) ; Missouri & P. Ry. Co. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753
(C. C. A. 8th, 1895). And see Moore v. Chicago & St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 21
Fed. 817 (C. C. D. Minn. 1884). Cf. Callahan v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., ii
Fed. 536 (C. C. M. D. Tenn. 1882).
I Railroad Co. v. Harris, supra note 8; Stone v. Farmer's Loan & T. Co.,
116 U. S.307. 316, 333, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 339, 346 (1885) (three states chartered
same individuals; a fourth granted similar powers to the corporation chartered
in one of the others; held, all four states had created corporations with local
citizenships); Penna. R. R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. R. Co., r18 U. S.
29o, 6 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1885); Goodlet v. Louisville R R. Co., 122 U. S.391, 7
Sup. Ct. 1254 (1886).
" Memphis & C. R. R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 58I, 2 Sup. Ct. 432 (1882).

NOTES

created a local corporation for jurisdictional purposes. There was
no question of the power of a state to domesticate a foreign corporation. It was purely a question of the intent of the legislature as
found by construing the statute intended to effect the domestication.
The general rule was expressed in Penna.R. R. Co. v. St. Louis, A.
&T. H. R. R. Co.1 4 :
"It may not be easy in all such cases to distinguish between
the purpose to create a new corporation which shall owe its existence to the law or statute under consideration, and the intent
to enable the corporation already in existence under the laws
of another state to exercise its functions in the state where it is
so received. . . . To make such a company a corporation
of another state the language used must imply creation or adoption in such form as to confer the power usually exercised over
corporations by the State or by the legislature, and such allegiance as a state corporation owes to its creator. The mere
grant of privileges or powers to it as an existing corporation,
without more, does not do this and does not make it a citizen of
the state conferring such powers."
In the various opinions of the Supreme Court lurk confusing
dicta and observations. But any doubts on the subject were apparently set at rest in St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. James,"' which
enunciated a new rule, now established,"6 that nothing short of the
incorporation of natural persons by a state will result in the creation
of a corporation whose members will be presumed to be citizens of
such state for purposes of jurisdiction under the diversity clause.
1

' Supra note 12, at 296, 6 Sup. Ct. at lO96. Although the rule was apparently
formulated as a test for determining if a new corporation was created for jurisdictional purposes, it is often quoted as a test for determining if a new corporation was created for local purposes only. See Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v.
Louisville T. Co., 174 U. S. 552, 562, 19 Sup. Ct 8T7, 821 (1898) ; FLETCHER,
CYcLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRivATE CoRPoRATioNs (igig) 93o4.
i 16i U. S. 545, 16 Sup. Ct. 621 (i8g6). In this case an Arkansas statute
required every foreign railroad corporation buying into or leasing an Arkansas
railroad to file a copy of its charter with the Secretary of State of Arkansas.
It would thereupon become a corporation of Arkansas. The defendant, originally chartered in Missouri, complied with the Arkansas statute. A citizen of
Missouri sued the railroad in the Federal District Court of Arkansas on a cause
of action arising in Missouri, claiming that the defendant was an Arkansas corporation by virtue of compliance with the Arkansas statute. Held, it remained a
corporation of Missouri, and the diversity of citizenship requisite for federal
jurisdiction was not present.
'The principle has been recognized by state courts. Russel v. St. L. &
S. W. Ry. Co., 7i Ark. 451, 75 S. W. 725 (I9O3); Davis v. Chesapeake & 0.
R. R. Co., 25 Ky. L. 342, 75 S. W. 275 (i9o3); Wilson v. Southern Ry. Co., 64
S. C. 6 36 S. E. 701 (i9o) overruling on the authority of the James case
Mathis v. Southern Ry. Co., 53 S. C. 246, 31 S. E. 240 (1898) ; Rece v. Newport
N. & M. V. Co., 32 W. Va. 164, 9 S. E. 212 (i889). Contra: Debnam v. Telephone Co., 126 N. C. 831, 36 S. E. 269 (xgoo) ; Layden v. Knights of Pythias,
128 N. C. 546,39 S. E. 47 (1901).

542

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

The case dearly sets forth that statutes purporting to make local
corporations of foreign corporations as such, although they might
be held to have created domestic corporations for certain local purposes, such as taxation " and eminent domain,' did not thereby
create corporations with local citizenship for jurisdictional purposes.
So that today, a corporation first incorporated in one state, even if
afterwards created as such a corporation in another, remains for
purposes of Federal jurisdiction a citizen of the state by which it was
originally created. 19
This doctrine was recently approved in Carolina,& N. W. R. R.
Co. v. Clover.20 A railroad corporation sued a town in South Carolina to recover taxes paid under protest. The suit was instituted in
the Federal District Court of South Carolina on the theory that the
plaintiff was a corporation of North Carolina and the defendant a
citizen of South Carolina and that the requisite diversity of citizenship was present. The town moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiff was also a citizen of South
Carolina. It appeared that the plaintiff corporation had been originally chartered by North Carolina in 1895 21 on petition of natural
persons. In 1897 the plaintiff corporation filed with the Secretary
of State of South Carolina a certified copy of the North Carolina
charter, pursuant to the terms of the Domestication Act 22 of South
Carolina. In i9oo the legislature of South Carolina passed an act
purporting to confirm the local incorporation of the North Carolina
railroad corporation and declaring it to be a local corporation endowed with specified powers..2 3 It was held, principally on the authority of the James case, that neither the Domestication Act nor the
special statute had created a South Carolina Corporation and that the
railroad remained for purposes of Federal jurisdiction a corporation
conclusively presumed to be composed of citizens of North Carolina.
Suit in the Federal court was therefore proper.
'Railroad v. Vance, 96 U. S. 450 (1877).
Although the decision here was
purely on the right of the domesticating state to tax the domesticated corporation, it would seem that even for jurisdictional purposes a domestic corporation,

under the rule of the James case, had been formed. An Indiana railroad leased a
line of an Illinois railroad and the Illinois legislature approved the lease and
declared that "the said lessees, their associates, successors, etc." should be a railroad corporation in Illinois. In fact there was only one lessee, the Indiana corporation, but the statute seems to imply a grant of corporate power to individuals.
' See Smith v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 96 Fed. 5o4 (C. C. D.

Mass. i899).

"9 Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Louisville T. Co., supra note 14.
034 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. W. D. S. C. x929).
Private Laws of N. C. 1895, chap. T90. p. 306.
2 22 ST. AT LARGE, S. C. 134, sec. 3, "That when a foreign corporation complies with the provisions and requirements of this Act, it shall ipso facto become
a domestic corporation . . . and shall be subject to the jurisdiction of this
State as fully as if it were originally created under the laws of the state of
South Carolina." See also 3 S. C. CODE OF LAws (1922) 1192, § 13.
'3 23 ST. AT LARGE, S. C. 567.

NOTES

The rule of the James case, however, seems to be limited 24 by
one earlier decision, Memphis and Charleston R. R. Co. v. Alabama,5
never expressly overruled. 26 A statute of Alabama granted powers
to a corporation of Tennessee in the first six sections and referred
to it in the last two sections as "the company hereby incorporated."
In addition to the usual provisions of a domestication statute, it con27
tained the requirement that the corporation sell stock in Alabama
and provide some place in Alabama where local stockholders might
vote for directors. The court decided that the whole intent of the
act was to make a separate corporation in Alabama. There was
clearly no incorporation of natural persons here. Therefore, if a
domesticating state requires changes in the financial structure of the
organization and in other ways indicates an active interest in the
management, it may be that a local corporation with local citizenship
may still be created out of a foreign corporation, without involving
natural persons as incorporators."'
The theory of the James case is briefly: (i) The original creation of the fiction that the natural persons who were members of a
corporation were citizens of the state of its incorporation went to the
verge of judicial power. (2) The fiction will not be applied where
there are no natural persons involved in the creation of the corporation, because in such case there are no natural persons whose citizenship can be presumed.2 9 It would seem that on such a theory the
rule there laid down is as artificial and arbitrary as the original fiction of the conclusive presumption. Yet in dealing with such unreal
concepts as the citizenship of a corporation results can only be
Smith v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., supra note 18.
= Supra note 13.
Note, however, this language in Railway v. Allison, 1go U. S. 326, 338, 23
Sup. Ct. 713, 718 (1902): "The difference between the above case (Memphis &
C. R. R. Co. v. Alabama) and the cases we have already referred to (James
case) is plain and fundamental, but in any event we regard the James case . . .
as decisive of the case before us." A corporation of one state which only becomes a corporation of another by compulsion of the latter, so as to do business
therein, is not a corporation thereof, but remains, so far as jurisdiction of the
Federal courts is concerned, a citizen of the state in which it was originally
incorporated. Missouri and P. Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 6o6
(1912).
WILLIAMS, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1927)
66, n. io3, considers the
Memphis case as contra to the principle of the James case.
^ A careful reading of the case will show that the purpose of opening books
for subscription of stock in Alabama was not to establish a separate capital stock
for an Alabama corporation but to "afford the citizens of Alabama an opportunity to take stock" in the Tennessee organization. A different interpretation is
placed on this clause of the statute in Calvert v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S. C. 139,
146, 41 S. E. 963, 965 (1901).
In the principal case, Carolina & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Clover, sitpra note
20, the special statute did allow the corporation to issue new stock but did not
require it.
-' St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. James, supra note 15 at 565, i6 Sup. Ct. at 628.
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achieved by making arbitrary rules. The virtue is in adhering to
them. If the principle of the James case is consistently applied in
all cases requiring it, a workable solution of this problem has been
reached.
D. B. K.

THE VALIDITY OF PREFERENCES

CREATED BY IrLES OF THE

STOCK EXCHANGE-An examination of the rules or by-laws of any
Stock Exchange, Board of Trade or similar trading association will
reveal, in practically every instance, some attempt to provide specially
for the association and its creditor members in the event of the insolvency of a fellow member by subjecting certain of his assets to
a preferential claim.' Since the effect of such rules often is to encroach upon or even to exclude the exercise of the normal rights of
non-member creditors, that they have provoked a volume of litigation is not surprising. The tendendy of the courts in the majority
of these cases has been to uphold the superior right of creditor members predicated upon such rules, and this even in bankruptcy proceedings. However, the recent cases of Middleton v. Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Company et al.2 and Middleton v. Dussoulas,8 in which the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the validity of
a preferential rule of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange on the ground
that it was in conflict with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act,
seem to define the extent to which an Exchange may go in impounding assets for the benefit of a particular class of creditors. In these
cases the Exchange's claim went to the surplus in a pledgee member's
hands after the sale of certain securities pledged by the bankrupt
member more than four months before bankruptcy to secure a loan
in connection with a transaction on the floor of the New York Stock
Exchange, of which only the pledgee was a member. The sale took
place upon insolvency, but within four months of bankruptcy; and
the court, quoting from the referee's report,4 held that the claim of
the Exchange constituted a voidable preference.
'For typical examples see the rules considered in Mohler v. Chamber of
Commerce of Minneapolis, 130 Minn. 288, 153 N. W. 617 (1915) ; O'Brien v.
S. Omaha Live Stock Exchange, ioi Neb. 729, i6 N. W. 724 (9,7); Board of

Trade of the City of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U. S. i, 44 Sup. Ct. 232 (1923) ;
Hyde v. Woods, 94 U. S. 523 (1876) ; In re Gregory et al., 174 Fed. 629 (C. C.
A. 2d, i9o9); Richardson v. Stormont, Todd & Co., [I9oo] i Q. B. 7o; and Ex

parte Grant, 13 Ch. D. 667 (i88o).
'C. C. A. 3d, Opinion filed Nov. 7, 1929.
C. C. A. 3d, Opinion filed Nov. 7, 1929.
'"'But even if this could be regarded as an assignment it was an assignment
merely of what might be termed a contingent equity, to become effective only
upon insolvency when the Bankruptcy law had begun to operate and to fix the
status of all classes of creditors.'"

NOTES
Prior to these cases in America all actions of this type have been
concerned with but two of these special rules. The first and by far
the most commonly disputed rule is one setting aside the proceeds
from the sale of the membership primarily for the benefit of member creditors, and the second, one which charges the proceeds arising
out of floor transactions of the insolvent with this same priority.
The Seat
In the leading case of Hyde v. Woods" the Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, said of the rule:
"There is no reason why the stock board should not make
membership subject to the rule in question, unless it be that it is
a violation of some statute, or of some principle of public policy.
It does not violate the provision of the bankrupt law against
preference of creditors, for such preference is only void when
made within four months previous 6 to the commencement of the
bankrupt proceedings. . . . A seat in this board is not a
matter of absolute purchase.

.

.

.

That rule entered into and

became an incident of the property when it was created,7 and
remains a part of it into whose hands soever it may come. As
the creators of this right-this property-took nothing from
any man's creditors when they created it, 11o wrong was done to
any creditor by the imposition of this condition." 8
A host of decisions following this case have more or less definitely
established the following propositions with regard to the seat or
membership: that the seat is property and a valuable asset of the
member; that, although clogged with qualifications and conditions,
Supra note i.
Italics the writer's. Apparently had a new membership been created and
transferred within four months of bankruptcy, a different result would have
been reached. The reasoning of the court at this point at least implies that they
viewed the rule as creating a valid lien.
"Italics the writer's.

IAt

525.

See Belton v. Hatch,

1o9

N. Y. 593, 596 (1888).

While it is true that no creditor was wronged by the mere creation of the
right, when it was transferred to the member the amount which he paid for it
was removed from his general assets, and what he received was tied up with the
condition imposed by the rule. The case is not as free from hardship as that of
Nicholls v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 (1875), relied on by the court, where the property in question was a legacy for which the bankrupt had given up no part of
his estate.
9Powell v. Waldron, 89 N. Y. 328 (1882); Platt v. Jones, 96 N. Y. 24
(1884) ; In re Ketchum, I Fed. 840 (D. C. N. Y. 188o) ; In re Gaylord, iii Fed.
717 (D. C. Mo. igoi); O'Dell v. Boyden, I5o Fed. 731 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o6);
In re Currie et al., 185 Fed. 263 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911) ; In re Stringer, 253 Fed.
352 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U. S. I, 12 Sup. Ct. 104

(i89I).
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the seat passes-with other property of the member to the receiver or
trustee in bankruptcy subject to these conditions; "I that the bankrupt
may be compelled by equity proceedings to execute and deliver such
papers as shall be necessary to effectuate the sale of the seat under
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act regarding the collection, reduction to money, and distribution of the estates of bankrupts; " that
the general creditors or their representative, the trustee, shall be entitled only to the surplus remaining after the satisfaction of the claims
of the Exchange and its members; 12 and that such claims must have
arisen from the business of the Exchange.'3
It is submitted that the reason for recognizing and upholding
this rule does not rest upon any acknowledged right or privilege of
the Exchange to subject any and all property of a defaulting member
to a superior claim in favor of itself and its members, but rather
that as a result of it the purchase of the seat is but a conditional
transfer with the member never in sole control thereof, but always
holding it subject to this running lien ' in favor of a particular class
of creditors, and that it is not against public policy to allow such
claims a priority.
In Barclay v. Smith, 107 Ill. 349 (883); Thompson v. Adams, 93 Pa. 55
(1879); and Gartner v. Pittsburgh Stock Exchange, 247 Pa. 482, 93 AUt. 759
(1915) the desire of the courts to preserve this asset from non-members led
to the holding that the seat was not property; but in the case of Page v.
Edmunds, 187 U. S. 596, 23 Sup. Ct. 200 (19o3), where an attempt was made to
use the Pennsylvania rule as effecting an exemption under state law, the Supreme
Court refused to uphold this contention on the ground that the exemption was
not made by any state statute, and, apparently on the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,
held that the seat was property.
'°Powell v. Waldron; In re Ketchum; In re Currie, et at.; Sparhawk v.
Yerkes; Page v. Edmunds, all supra note 9; Solinsky v. New York Stock
Exchange, 26o Fed. 266 (D. C. N. Y. i9ig); In re Werder, 15 Fed. 789 (C. C.
N. J. 1883).
U In re Ketchum, supra note 9; In re Hurlbutt, Hatch & Co., 135 Fed. 504
(C. C. A. 2d, 29o5). See also It re Nichols, i Fed. 842 (D. C. N. Y. 188o).
Even in Pennsylvania the court admits
12 Cases suzpra notes 9, io, and ii.
that, in the case of an assignment of the seat, any surplus proceeds would go to
the assignee.
UBernheim v. Keppler, 34 N. Y. Misc. 321, 69 N. Y. Supp. 803 (igol). In
the case of Cockran v. Adams, i8o Pa. 289, 295, 36 Att. 854, 855 (897) only
debts arising from Stock Exchange transactions were allowed to be proved,
despite a rule providing for "all indebtedness". The court arrived at its decision
by referring to a rule limiting the powers of the Arbitration Committee and
then applying the maxim inclusio unus est exclusio alterius. In n re Fisk &
Robinson, 185 Fed. 974, 975 (D. C. N. Y. 1911) the transaction did not arise on
the floor of the Exchange, but was nevertheless a part of the business of that
Exchange.
It is interesting to note that Rule 182 of the London Stock Exchange provides as follows: "A claim which does not arise from a Stock Exchange transaction cannot be proved against a Defaulter's estate." VAmEXY, RuLES OF THE
STOCK EXCHANGE (1925)

98.

" Mohler v. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis, supra note i; In re
Meadows, Williams & Co., 173 Fed. 694 (D. C. N. Y. i9og); i Dos PAssos,
SToc-BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES (2d

ed.

29o5)

125.

NO TES

Proceeds Arising from Floor Transactions
In the case of In re Gregory et al.'5 the court, relying upon the
reasoning in Hyde v. Woods:6 and Page v. Edmunds," said:
"We see no such difference between the seat and profits
from stock transactions as to require a different disposition of
the latter from the former." 's
That a material part of the estate of the member was taken out of
the Bankruptcy Act and forever placed beyond the reach of the general creditors, for whose protection the act was designed, must be
obvious when we read that there was nothing left from these assets
to go to the trustee after the Exchange claims were satisfied. Notwithstanding the decision of the court to the contrary, it is difficult
to find the alleged similarity between these assets and the seat. While
it is true that they came to him by virtue of his membership, they
were not transferred to him by the Exchange and the latter was therefore unable to place any condition on them by virtue of being the
transferor. They were not constant and static in the sense that the
seat was, and were not always subject to the control of the Exchange.
Their value and existence was not strictly speaking dependent upon
any action of the Exchange. Furthermore, since they came into
existence as assets of the bankrupt within four months of bankruptcy,
one of the most cogent reasons in the case of Hyde v. Woods "ois
removed, and the case would seem to fly in the face of the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act. Apparently the sole reason for the decision
is a negative one, that it is not contrary to public policy; and quaere
whether it is not contrary to public policy to cut off the rights of
general creditors in such a manner when there is no apparent legal
justification for it.
The case is different from the English case of Ex parte Grant,20
cited by Judge Ward in the Gregory case, in which the "difference
fund" in question was in the nature of a voluntary contribution of
note i.
10Supra
Supra note i.
27 Supra note 9.
18Supra note I, at 63f; cf. Cohen v. Budd, 52 N. Y. Misc. 217,
Supp. 45 (1906).
Supra note i.

103

N. Y.

.- Supra note i. In this case, in accordance with a rule of the Exchange, the
existing contracts of the defaulter to be closed the next "settling day" were
closed out by the Exchange immediately at a price fixed by the Exchange. All

members who owed any amount on that basis paid it in to the Exchange assignee
to be used for the purpose of paying any members who were owed money on the

same basis. The trustee in bankruptcy claimed the money in the Exchange
assignee's hands. The court pointed out that there was no hardship, since, hav-

ing defaulted, the bankrupt would be in no position to realize on his winning

contracts; and that the trustee was attempting to claim a fund collected for a

certain purpose and which would not have arisen but for the rules of the Exchange, and at the same time refusing to apply it to that purpose.
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the members, and would never have come into existence but for the
operation of certain rules of the Exchange. In.that case the fund
never belonged to the bankrupt, but was created for a particular purpose and only had existence for the purpose of being dealt with in a
particular way.
Although it is true that every person joins such an association
voluntarily and when he does so it is with the express agreement to
become bound by the rules,2" and although the rules are necessary for
the orderly conduct of the business of the Exchange, such rules should
be limited in their effect to the members themselves.22 The proposition is very clearly expressed in the English case of Tomkins v.
Saffery,28 where the court refused to uphold a rule of the Exchange
requiring a failing member to turn over all his assets to an assignee
appointed by the Exchange to be administered for the benefit of
Exchange creditors on the ground that such a transfer constituted
a cessio bonorum made by an insolvent on the eve of bankruptcy with
a view to preferring certain creditors. In the words of the Chancellor,
Lord Cairns:
"Therefore, although everything done in the domestic forum
of the Stock Exchange under those rules may be done according
to the rules, and may be most wholesome in its operation for
the members of the Stock Exchange, still, what is done must be
subject to the rights of those who are not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Stock Exchange, and when those higher rights
come into conflict with these rules, of course these rules must
give way to those higher rights." 24
The attempt of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in the two
recent cases above to extend its jurisdiction to transactions taking
place upon the floor of another Exchange seems clearly an unwarranted assumption of authority, and certainly falls within the rule
just set forth. The rule in the case of the seat unquestionably creates
a preference, but one, as we have seen, that the Exchange had a right
to make. In the case of floor transactions the rule was extended to
cover this situation, but apparently without reason or regard for the
Bankruptcy law. Such a rule manifestly affects "the rights of those
who are not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Stock Exchange."
However, passing over this, it is impossible to see how the court could
have decided otherwise in the Dussoulas and Fidelity-Philadelphia
"Each member of the Stock Exchange becomes a member on the footing
that he will observe the rules, and there is ample consideration for their enforcement against any person so becoming a member." Romer, L. J., in Richardson v.
Stormont, Todd & Co., supra note I, at 712.
' Cohen v. Budd, sutpra note 18; Thos. A. Biddle & Co. v. Brown, 8 Pa. D.
& C. 579 (1927) (custom denying lawful rights of non-members held invalid);
Blakemore, Mayo & Co. v. Heyman, 6 Fed. 581 (C. C. Ky. 1881).
[877] 3 A. C. 213.

.Ibid. at 22o.

NOTES

Trust Company cases, despite the tolerant attitude of the courts in
previous cases. As the court emphatically points out, no valid lien
was created.2 5 An Exchange will not be permitted to recognize nor
will it recognize claims of member creditors not arising out of the
business of the Exchange, 2 semble that it should be restricted from
exercising dominion over outside transactions for the purpose of
administering assets for its own benefit. 2 The words of Lowell, I.
used in another connection are particularly applicable to the cases in
question:
such an agreement merely amounts to an agreement to give a preference if one should become necessary." 28
It must be clear that only in the cases of the seat and in the
English cases affecting "differences" do we find .any rational basis
for supporting these preferential rules; and such support should be
strictly limited to those cases on their particular facts. No suitable
analogies are possible between those cases and cases where other funds
are in question, and, it is submitted that the recent cases in question
very properly curtail what might lead to a high-handed usurpation
of power on the part of Exchanges, 9 a result which should have
been reached as early as the Gregory case.
D. T. E., Jr.
COLLATERAL STIPUrATIONS ON CHECxs GIVEN IN SATISFACTION
OF DISPUTED CLAIMS AS CONSTITUTING ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

-An accord and satisfaction, being a contract, must be supported
by consideration. Because of this ithas become an almost universal
rule of law that the payment of part of a liquidated claim cannot be
a satisfaction for the whole, because of a want of consideration.,
This rule has received much criticism 2 and courts were quite willing
I See (1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 134 for a discussion of this aspect of the
District Court's decision in Middleton v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company
et al., sub nom. In re McCoWn, 31 Fed. (2d) 334 (D.C. Pa. 1928).
2'Supra note 13.
2Supra note 23; Re Woodd; Ex parte King, 82 L. T. (N. s.) 504 (i90o) in
which the court allowed the Exchange to retain the difference fund, but ordered
all claims collected by the Exchange to be turned over to the trustee to be administered as a part of the estate.
IEx parte Ames, Fed. Cas. No. 323, at 748, i Lowell 561, 564 (D. C. Mass.

187).

20 I

Dos PAssos, op. cit. supra note 14, at x29.

"Fire Ins. Assn., Ltd. v. Wickham, i4i U. S. 564, 12 Sup. Ct 84 (1891);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cottingham, 103 Md. 319, 63 At. 359 (i9o6); Gilman v.
Cary, 198 Mass. 318, 84 N. E. 312 (1908).
'Melroy v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 381, 383, 67 Atl. 699, 700 (i9o7): "The
logic is unimpeachable, but it fails to take into consideration the practical importance of the difference between the right to a thing and the actual possession of
it." Dreyfus v. Roberts, 75 Ark. 354, 87 S. W. 641 (I9O5) ; Skelton v. Jackson,
2o Tex.Civ.App.443,49 S.W. 415 (1899).
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to adopt the view that, in the case of unliquidated or disputed claims,
the payment of a lesser sum would discharge the entire debt.3 In
such case either party has the right to have the dispute settled in a
court of law and "the concession made by one is a good consideration
for the concession made by the other." 4
The rule that the acceptance of a less sum than claimed, in satisfaction of an unliquidated or disputed claim, operates as an accord
and satisfaction, is very often applied in the cases where a debtor
sends his creditor a check in payment of a disputed claim, the check
containing on its face words indicating that, if accepted, it is to be
payment in full. In a recent Kentucky case 1 the court held that
where there was a bona fide dispute as to the amount due and the
creditor accepted a check on which was written "For account in full,
etc.," when the amount of the check was, in fact, a lesser sum than
the creditor claimed was due, there was an accord and satisfaction
of the entire debt and the creditor could not recover the amount he
claimed to be the balance due. This decision is in accord with the
great weight of authority in such cases."
The first requirement to bring a case within the above rule is
that there be an unliquidated or disputed claim. Mr. Williston states
that:
"An unliquidated claim is one the amount of which has not
been fixed by agreement or cannot be exactly determined by the
application of the rules of arithmetic or of law. A disputed
claim may be either liquidated or unliquidated." 7
It has also been stated that "when it is admitted that one of two
specific sums is due, but there is a genuine dispute as to which is the
proper amount, the demand is regarded as unliquidated, within the
meaning of that term as applied to the subject of accord and satisfaction." s A claim will also be considered unliquidated, although it
is not disputed except for a set-off or claim for damages which the
debtor has against the creditor and which the creditor does not concede.9 In such case the entire claim is unliquidated because of the
dispute over the set-off. The claim over which the dispute arises
'Chicago R. R. Co. v. Clark, 178 U. S. 353, 20 SUp. Ct 924 (1900) ; U. S.
Bobbin Co. v. Thissell, 137 Fed. i (C. C. A. ist, 19o4); Nassoiy v. Tomlinson,
148 N. Y. 326, 42 N. E. 715 (1896).
'Hand Lumber Co. v. Hall, 147 Ala. 561, 564, 41 So. 78, 79 (19o6).
'Alcorn v. Arthur, 2o S. W. (2d) 276 (Ky. 1929).
'Brackin v..Owens Horse and Mule Co., I95 Ala. 579, 71 So. 97 (1916);
Brown v. Symes, 83 Hun (N. Y.) i59, 31 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1894); Hull v.
Johnson, 22 R. I. 66, 46 Ad. x82 (1900).
7 i Wn.lSTON., CONTRACTS (1920) § 128.
8

Chicago R. R. Co. v. Clark, supra note 3 at 367, 20 Sup. Ct at 929.
Ostrander v. Scott, i61 Ill. 339, 43 N. E. io89 (i896) (dispute over commissions agent wished to set-off) ; Tanner v. Merrill, io8 Mich. 58, 65 N. W.
664 (i895) ; Hull v. Johnson, supra note 6 (set-off of damages for goods lost
by carrier).
9

NOTES

need not be well-founded so long as the dispute is bona fide,"° and
the dispute may be over a question of fact or a question of law."1
Another requirement to bring a case within the rule is that there
be a sufficient offer or tender on the part of the debtor. This question is often extremely close. The general rule is that the money
must be offered in full satisfaction of the demand and be accompanied
by such acts and declarations on the part of the debtor as amount to
a condition that the money, if accepted, be in satisfaction, and it must
be such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand
therefrom that if he takes it, he takes it subject to such condition.' 2
Probably the most usual instance in which a question arises as to
the sufficiency of an offer or tender is in the case of payment, by
check, of part of a disputed claim in satisfaction of the whole. According to the weight of authority the offer will be sufficient when
a check is given which on its face expresses that it is in full payment
or settlement of the demand.' 8 But there must' be no uncertainty
as to the condition intended.' 4 In the words of the Supreme Court
of Illinois: 15
"Proof must be clear and unequivocal that the observance
of the condition was insisted upon, and must not admit of the
inference that the debtor intended that his creditor might keep
the money tendered, in case he did not assent to the condition
upon which it was offered."
If the debtor believed when he remitted a check containing the words,
"In full to date" that it was all that was due or claimed by the
creditor when in fact, it was less than was due, it was not a sufficient
offer or tender,'8 because in such case the debtor had no knowledge
' Simons v. Supreme Council A. L. H., 178 N. Y. 263, 70 N. E. 776 (19o4);
"It matters not whether there was a 'solid foundation for the dispute'. The test
in such cases is: Was the dispute honest or fraudulent?" Metropolitan Shirt
Waist Co. v. Kamione, 138 N. Y. Supp. io67, io68 (1913).
'Dunn v. Whalen, i2o App. Div. 729, io5 N. Y. Supp. 588 (907); see
Coal Co. v. Gross, 157 Ill. App. 218 (19io).
'Hillestad v. Lee, 9i Minn. 335, 97 N. W. 1055 (1904), holding that there
was not an accord and satisfaction; Canadian Fish Co. v. McShane, 8o Neb.
551, 114 N. W. 594 (i9o8) ; Rose v. American Paper Co., 83 N. J. L. 707, 85
At. 354 (1913), and see comment (1912) 61 U. op PA. L. REv. 534.
' N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v. MacDonald, 62 Colo. 67, i6o Pac. 193 (i916) ; Goss
v. Rishel, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1O45 (i9o4).
"H-illestad v. Lee, supra note 12: "It cannot be too strongly stated that with
us an accord and satisfaction can never be implied from language of doubtful
meaning; . . . Hence, when a substantial doubt arises, there can be no such
implication, the usual rule applies, and the payment will be treated as on account
only." Lovekin v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 282 Pa. io, io3, 127 At. 450, 451
(i925).
' Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin, 117 II. App. 622, 625 (i9o5), aff'd, 21
Ill. 244, 74 N. E. 143 (19o5).
"Canadian Fish Co. v. McShane, supra note 12 at 554, 114 N. W. at 595:
"He [the creditor] was justified in treating it. as the act of an honest debtor
remitting less than was due under a mistake as to the nature of the contract."
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of the dispute, and there could be, therefore, no intention to create
a condition that it be in full settlement. Neith!er is it a sufficient
offer or tender if a check is sent for a sum less than is admitted by

the debtor to be due.17
There is a decided conflict of authority on the question whether
payment by the debtor of that amount which he concedes to be due
will be an accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim. The majority
view is that the entire claim, in such case, is in dispute and there is,
8
therefore, consideration and an accord and satisfaction is effected,"
while a minority hold that if the debtor pays just what he concedes
to be due there is no detriment to him nor benefit to the creditor and,
therefore, no consideration for an accord and satisfaction."
Words on checks which have been held a sufficient offer and
tender to constitute an accord and satisfaction are the following: "In
full for painting",20 "The payee hereby acknowledges receipt in full
2"
"In
settlement of account", 2 1 "Payment in full for commissions",
24
3
full settlement as per contract", "To bal. acct.", "Payment in full
28
to date", 25 "As full settlement of claim against me", "In full of all
28
2
"In full to
demands to date", " "In full settlement of all claims",
29
of payee
"Indorsement
of
account",o
"In
full
date for all claims",
3
will constitute a receipt in full". ' On the other hand a Pennsylvania
case 22 held that there was not a sufficiently clear offer or tender of
an accord and satisfaction by a check containing on its face the words,
'7Wilson v. Duncan, 269 S. W. 239 (Tex. 1925), where the debtor claimed
he owed only 5 per cent. as attorney's fees but paid less than 5 per cent., the
creditor claiming io per cent.
'IN. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hanger, 2oo Ky. 118, 254 S. W. 326
(1923) ; Tanner v. Merrill, supra note 9; Ravenswood Paper Mill Co. v. Dix, 61
Misc. 235, 113 N. Y. Supp. 721 (19o8) ; note (1924) 9 MINN.L. REv. 458.

'Demeules v. Jewel Tea Co., 1O3 Minn. 150, 152, 114 N. W. 733 (1908):
"The company paid, and Demeules accepted and applied, only what the company
conceded that it owed. It therefore suffered no detriment by paying that
amount. It yielded nothing, and Demeules received nothing, more than the company conceded was his due." Bostram v. Gibson, InIIll. App. 457 (1903);
Weidner v. Standard Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 130 Wis. I0,no N. W. 246
(19o6) ; see Lovekin v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., supra note 14.
"o
Beck Electric Co. v. National Contracting Co., 143 Minn. 19o, 173 N. W.
413 (1919).

2 Bartley v. Pictorial Review Co., 188 Mo. App. 639, 176 S.W. 489 (1915).
' Gribble'v. Raymond, 124 App. Div. 829, io9 N. Y. Supp. 242 (19o8).
-'Marx v. White Co., 143 N. Y. Supp. 1036 (1913), aft'd, 148 N. Y. Supp.
262 (1914).

- Lafrentz v. Cavanaugh, 166 Ill. App. 3o6 (19o9).
2 Barham v. Bank of Delight, 94 Ark. 158, 126 S. W. 394 (191o).
Brown v. Symes, supra note 6.
' Goss v. Rishel, supra note 13.
SMcKenty v. Oceonus Mfg. Co., x23 N. Y. Supp. 983 (igio).
Cohen v. Levine, 114 N. Y. Supp. 840 (Igog).
Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin, supra note 15.
'Meyers v. Hirsch, 125 Misc. 261, 21o N. Y. Supp. 466 (1925).
' Lovekin v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., supra note 14.

NOTES

"If amount is not satisfactory, return without alteration or correction", and on the back of the check the words, "By the endorsement
of this voucher check the payee accepts the amount of same in payment of account as per statement of settlement within."
The third requirement to constitute an accord and satisfaction
is that there be an-acceptance by the creditor of the check and the
condition thereon. It is generally stated that if the claim is disputed
or unliquidated and the tender of a check in settlement thereof is of
such character as to give the creditor notice that it must be accepted
in full satisfaction of the claim or not at all, the retention and use
thereof by the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction, and
it matters not whether the creditor strike out the words on the check
before cashing it,3 nor that he immediately notify the debtor that he
accepts the check only in part payment because he must either return
the check or accept the condition.34 Such an acceptance is generally
held conclusive on the creditor of an accord and satisfaction, 3 but
there are a few cases in which assent on the part of the creditor is
treated as a question of fact.38 It is also generally held that retention
of the check for a long period of time acts as an acceptance of the
offer by the creditor and is conclusive as an accord and satisfaction
on him although he has not cashed the check nor used it.3 7 So also
where the creditor has not used the check but has had it certified, he
is generally held to have accepted the condition,3 s on the ground that
the certification of the check is equivalent to payment thereof.
Knowledge by the creditor of the stipulation on the check is not
'Beck Electric Co. v. National Contracting Co., supra note 2o (creditor
erased "in full"); Bartley v. Pictorial Review Co., supra note 21 (creditor
erased the word "full" before word "settlement" and wrote in "part") ; Gribble
v. Raymond, supra note 22 (creditor erased words "payment in full for commissions"). But cf. Bisbee v. Pulpit Farm Dairy, 78 N. H. 372, ioo At. 672 (1917) ;
Siegele v. Des Moines Mutual Ins. Assn., 28 S. D. 142, 132 N. W. 697 (1gII)
holding that where the creditor erased the stipulation on the check and then
cashed it, the creditor had not accepted, but rather had shown by his act that he
refused to accept it.
' Barham v. Bank of Delight, supra note 25; Day-Luellwitz Co. v. Serrell,
177 Ill. App. 30 (913).

'Day-Luellwitz Co. v. Serrell, ibid.; U. S. Bobbin Co. v. Thissell, supra
note 3; Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin, supra note I5.
*' Worcester Colo. Co. v. Woods Sons Co., 209 Mass. IO5, 95 N. E. 392
(r91)

; Robinson v. Detroit R. R. Co., 84 Mich. 658, 48 N. W.

205

(1891) ; St.

Pierre v. Peerless Casualty Co., 77 N. H. 599, 92 Atl. 84o (1914) ; Armstrong v.
Lonon, I49 N. C. 434, 63 S. E. IO (I9O8).
' Day-Luellwitz Co. v. Serrell, supra note 34 (held by creditor for three and
one-half months) ; Hamilton v. Stewart, 1o5 Ga. 300, 31 S. E. 184 (1898), aff'd,
io8 Ga. 472, 34 S. E. 123 (I899) (held by creditor until a few months before
trial). But cf. Rauh v. Wolf, 59 Misc. 419, iio N. Y. Supp. 923 (i9o8);
Fredonia Gas Co. v. Elwood Supply Co., 71 Kan. 464, 8o Pac. 969 (9o5) (in
both of these cases whether retention was for an unreasonable length of time
was held to be a question of fact).
'Scheffenacker

v. Hoopes, 113 Md. II,

Whalen, supra note ii.

77 Atl. I3O (i9IO); Dunn v.
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essential to constitute an acceptance. 9 Thus a case in New York
held that there was an accord and satisfaction though the creditor
had never seen the check, which was indorsed by his son, who was
authorized only to cash checks for deposit.40 And an accord and
satisfaction is effected though the creditor is unable to read the stipulation on the check before it is cashed. 4' It is also immaterial whether
or not the creditor understood the legal effect of his acceptance; it is
not necessary that he should understand that the effect of his acceptance of the check containing the stipulation will be to estop him from
recovering the balance which he claims. 42 Nor can the creditor be
relieved of the effect of his acceptance after he has once used the
check although he tender the proceeds thereof at the time suit is
brought for the balance. 43 But where a check is accepted which is
accompanied by a statement that it is in full settlement of account
to date, the creditor may still recover the balance if it appears that
many other checks had been accepted by him with similar conditions
and the debtor had never previously urged an accord and satisfac44
tion.

Thus it will be seen that courts will very readily imply an acceptance on the part of the creditor if they can find an unliquidated
or disputed claim and an offer or tender by the debtor of part payment on condition that it shall constitute payment in full. This would
seem to be the proper attitude for courts to take, inasmuch as it is in
accord with the policy of the law to allow parties to effect settlement
of disputes by adjustment between themselves whenever possible.45

A.W.B.
'This is in accord with the general law of contracts, that one who signs a
contract is held to assent thereto whether he has read what is contained therein
or not. See I WrLLIsToN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 35.
'Marx v. White, supra note 23. But cf. Fineman v. Hardin, 29 Ga. App.
571, ii6 S. E. 216 (1923), holding that there was no accord and satisfaction
merely because there was a notation on the check that it was in full settlement
of the claim so long as the creditor had no actual knowledge of such notation
even though he received the money from the bank.
,I Anderson v. Standard Granite Co., 92 Me. 429, 43 At. 21 (i899) ; "It was
within his power and in the exercise of reasonable care was his duty, to have
ascertained the contents of the check, as he might readily have done by asking
those who cashed it for him, or any one else, to read it to him . . . He must
be held to have known what it was his business to have known before he finally
accepted it and cashed it." Linn Co. v. Harris, 118 Ill. App. 5, 8 (9o5).
' Schumacher v. Moffitt, 7, Or. 79, 142 Pac. 353 (i914).
'Shahan v. Bayer' Vehicle Co., 179 Iowa 923, 162 N. W. 221 (917).
"'Pike v. Buzzell, 76 N. H. 120, 79 Ad. 992 (igii). This would indicate
that if all checks sent out by a firm contain a printed stipulation that they are
payment in full, the firm cannot, when it chooses to, urge an accord and satisfaction if it failed to do so by the previous checks sent.
"The law looks with favor upon the adjustment of controversies without
the intervention of courts." Shahan v. Bayer Vehicle Co., sarpra note 43 at 930,
x62 N. W. at 223; "The law favors the settlement of controversies and so holds
that an offer of money made and accepted on that condition binds both parties.
. . . The law leaves the parties where their acts have put them." Hull v.
Johnson, supra note 6 at 67, 46 AtI. at 18-2.

